Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 86
Issue 5 Symposium: Creativity and the Law
9-1-2011

A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public
Domain in Copyright Law
Abraham Drassinower

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Recommended Citation
Abraham Drassinower, A Note on Incentives, Rights, and the Public Domain in Copyright Law, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1869 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol86/iss5/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 4

A NOTE ON INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Abraham Drassinower*
I.

A

GAP IN MINIMALIST COPYRIGHT DISCOURSE

The idea that the purpose of copyright law is to provide incentives for creativity is among the most fundamental and most established ideas in North American copyright discourse. There can be
no doubt, of course, that copyright discourse in North America is
highly contested. Some regard it as nothing less than the site of socalled "copyright wars," of intense struggles-intellectual as much as
practical, political as much as theoretical-between copyright maximalists and copyright minimalists, advocates of high copyright protection and advocates of low copyright protection. 2 This manifest
presence of vibrant, vigorous, and vivid controversy, however,
obscures the depth of the latent agreement that frames it. Few, if any
at all, would contest the bedrock idea that copyright law is about pro©
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1 See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS INTHE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169-73 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
2 See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 1-41 (2009).
For discussion of copyright maximalism and copyright minimalism, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a DemocraticCivil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285-88 (1996).
For discussion of copyright politics, see JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001).
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viding incentives for creativity. 3 The pervasiveness of the hold that
instrumentalism has over the North American copyright imagination
is paralleled only by the ease with which that imagination summarily
rejects or dismisses rights-based accounts of copyright law-accounts
rooted in a vision of the inherent dignity of authorship.
One of the nodal points of the copyright wars is the ongoing discussion about the expansion of copyright scope and copyright subject
matter since the enactment of the Statute of Anne, 4 the world's first
copyright statute, in eighteenth century England. Predictably, whereas
copyright minimalists object strenuously to this expansion, copyright
maximalists support it. Equally unsurprisingly, both maximalists and
minimalists formulate their position from the shared standpoint of
instrumentalist copyright theory.
My purpose here is to offer minimalists some words of both caution and comfort. The cautionary aspect is that minimalism ought to
be far more suspicious than it actually is about the instrumentalist
hegemony in copyright discourse. Instrumentalist discourse is, in my
view, part and parcel of the very expansion that minimalism seeks to
counter. Copyright protection has consistently expanded since Donaldson v. Beckett affirmed (a) the supremacy of the Statute of Anne
over common law copyright, and (b) the still prevailing view that copyright law is not a juridical recognition of rights inherent in the act of
authorship but rather a policy instrument designed to promote the
public interest in creativity. Thus, historically speaking, copyright
expansion has taken place and continues to take place under the
supremacy of instrumentalism. To be sure, this historical correlation
is not by itself sufficient to persuade us that instrumentalism is necessarily complicit in the constriction of the public domain. It does strike
3

For examples of such contestation, see ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KwALL, THE SOUL
23, 53 (2010); Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as PublicAddress- On the
Specificity of Copyrightv vis-d-vis Patent and Trade-mark, 2008 Micu. ST. L. REV. 199;
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1548 (1993);Justin Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. LJ. 287, 303-04 (1988); and Alfred C. Yen,
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 518
(1990). See also Maurizio Borghi & Stavroula Karapapa, Non-Display Uses of Copyrighted
Works: Google Books and Beyond, 1 QUEEN MARYJ. INTELL. PROP. 21 (2011) (arguing for
protection of non-display uses of digital works through data protection law in order to
account for authorship rights more adequately than traditional copyright law); Kim
Treiger-Bar-Am, Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDozo
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1059 (2008) (calling for a recognition of the tradition of authors'
rights extant in the Anglo-American copyright regime).
OF CREATIVITY

4 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
5

1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).
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me as sufficient, however, to generate significant unease about any
uncritical adoption of the instrumentalist paradigm in the name of
6
the expansion of the public domain.
The comfort I seek to offer is that there are, of course, alternative
accounts of copyright law. These accounts are none other than the
rights-based accounts that, in its habitual endorsement of instrumentalism, minimalism dismisses far too summarily. One of the major
complaints that minimalism levels against rights-based discourse is
that, once enshrined as a matter of inherent dignity, the rights of
authors under copyright law cannot be easily constrained. With this
complaint in mind, I want to emphasize that, on the contrary, rightsbased discourse envisions not only the claims of authorship but also,
and therefore, those of the public domain as a matter of inherent
dignity. The rights-based account of authorship is also a rights-based
account of the public domain. My purpose is, in short, to generate
minimalist unease about instrumentalism and to evoke the as yet
largely unexplored potential of a rights-based minimalism. 7 At the
very least, I seek to undo the widespread apprehension that rightsbased accounts are necessarily maximalist accounts.
Following a sketch of the shared terrain on which the copyright
wars take place (Part II), I make some observations about minimalism
as a critical stance seeking to oppose a particular normative conception of copyright law to the realities of copyright expansion (Part III).
I then briefly describe the historical correlation between instrumentalism and copyright expansion (Part IV). I conclude with some remarks
6 For varying formulations of that unease, see Anne Barron, Copyright Infringement, 'Free-Riding'and the Lifeworld, in CoPRIGl-r AND PIRACY 93 (Lionel Bently et al.
eds., 2010); Maurizio Borghi, Copyright and Truth, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. no. 1,
art. 2 (2011), http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol12/issl/art2; Maurizio Borghi,
Owning Form, Sharing Content: Natural-Right Copyright and DigitalEnvironment, in 5 NEW
DIRECrONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 197 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007); Abraham Drassinower, From Distributionto Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept of Balance in Copyright Law,
34 J. CoRP. L. 991 (2009) [hereinafter Drassinower, From Distribution to Dialogue];
Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright
Law, 16 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 3 (2003) [hereinafter Drassinower, A Rights-Based
View]. See also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 I-HAv. L. REV. 281, 350-51 (1970) (arguing that instrumentalist account provides a weak general case for copyright protec-

tion); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?,
12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. no. 1, art. 3, at 29, 54-58 (2011), http://www.bepress.
com/til/default/voll2/issl/art3 (juxtaposing instrumentalist account of copyright

law with issues concerning the nature of the creative process).
7 See Hugh Breakey, Natural Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Domain, 73
MOD. L. REV. 208 (2010); Abraham Drassinower, Taking User Rights Seriously, in IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 462 (Michael Geist ed., 2005).
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about the absence in instrumentalist discourse of an account of the
necessary role of the public domain in copyright law, and about the
presence of such an account in rights-based discourse (Part V).

1I.

A SHARED TERRAIN

Because they unfold under the unifying aegis of instrumentalism,
the so-called copyright wars are far less disruptive than they first
appear. They are not foundational struggles about the very purpose
and meaning of copyright. Rather, they resemble civil wars in which
the combatants are equally faithful to the absent nation each feels the
other betrays. By creating the appearance of controversy, the struggle
between maximalists and minimalists sustains the underlying hegemony of the instrumentalist paradigm. As much as maximalists, minimalists deploy the concept of copyright as a way of providing
incentives for creativity. The debate is not about the appropriateness
of that concept but about the way in which it should be
operationalized.
Generally speaking, the minimalist view is not that copyright is
about something other than incentives but that, while central, incentives to produce works of authorship are not the whole of the copyright story. The role of incentives must be grasped within the larger
context of a view of copyright law as a balance between incentives and
dissemination, creator-interests and user-interests. 8 An overemphasis
of the incentive-function of copyright protection can sabotage the
equally constitutive dissemination-function of copyright law. In a
word, to use Jessica Litman's felicitous formulation, copyright is as
much about reading and listening as it is about writing and composing works of authorship. 9
Of course, maximalism is by no means indifferent to the dissemination-function of copyright law. The maximalist point is that, as distinct from production, dissemination of works of authorship itself
requires incentives, and that therefore the dissemination-function of
copyright law is best supported not by limiting copyright protection
but, on the contrary, by strengthening it further so as to render it
serviceable from the standpoint not only of production but also of
8 See JAMEs BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 3-9 (2008); Christophe Geiger, Promoting
Creativity Through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright
Law, 12 VAND.J. ENTI. & TECH. L. 515, 527 (2010); Ariel Katz, What Antitrust Law Can
(and Cannot) Teach About the First Sale Doctrine (May 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1845842.
9 Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1882 (2007).
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dissemination.10 Not only authors but also publishers and distributors
need incentives to fulfill their role in the copyright system. It is short
sighted to believe that liberating use (or aspects thereof) from protection would be in and of itself sufficient to catalyze modes of dissemination consistent with the incentive-function of copyright protection.
The minimalist challenge to the maximalist construal arises from
a different assessment of the effects that certain levels of copyright
protection (and hence certain corresponding levels of user rights or
privileges within the copyright system) do or do not have, would or
would not have, on the public interest in the production and dissemination of works of authorship that copyright is intended to serve. In
this vein, the minimalist complaint against copyright expansion is not
a complaint against that expansion per se. It is rather about the effects
of that expansion. If copyright expansion were shown to be conducive to the public interest in production and dissemination, then
there would be nothing wrong with it, at least from a copyright perspective. The dispute between maximalists and minimalists is in this
respect largely empirical. It seems that the extent to which one feels
uncomfortable with copyright in general, or with copyright expansion
in particular, is related to the degree to which one believes that copyright does in fact promote the production and dissemination of works
of authorship. But the bedrock proposition that copyright is an
instrument designed to foster and disseminate creativity is common to
maximalists and minimalists alike. It is the deeply common terrain
that the copyright wars leave uncontested.
III.

EMPIRICAL AND NoRmATrIvE

To the extent that this common terrain remains uncontested,
minimalist opposition to copyright expansion is likely to remain not
only largely ineffective but also self-defeating. This is because the
affirmation of the public domain requires challenging not merely the
maximalist construal of the instrumental copyright calculus but also,
and more fundamentally, the very premise that copyright is an instrumental calculus to begin with.
In instrumentalist terms, the minimalist stance towards copyright
expansion is that expansive copyright is at odds with copyright's own
purpose of promoting creativity. Formulated in that way, the stance is
particularly interesting because, faced with evidence it accepts that
copyright has as a matter of fact expanded to such an extent that,
systemically speaking, it stifles rather than promotes creativity, the
10

See, e.g.,

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw

167 (2003).
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minimalist stance nonetheless insists on the view that copyright is
about promoting creativity. This ambiguity is, of course, easily resolvable. When faced with the empirical reality of copyright expansion, the
minimalist stance distinguishes copyright as an empirical reality from
copyright as a juridical order. The view is that the idea that copyright
is about promoting creativity is after all a normative, not empirical,
proposition. The absence of empirical evidence to substantiate it is
therefore not immediately relevant to its validity. It is perfectly possible to say (a) existing copyright law does not promote creativity; (b)
copyright law ought to promote creativity; (c) we should therefore
alter existing copyright law so as to make it live up to its own creativitypromoting purpose.
In this way, the idea that copyright is, normatively speaking,
about promoting creativity may be sustained even if copyright is not in
fact promoting creativity, empirically speaking. Copyright both is
(normatively) and is not (empirically) about promoting creativity.
This seems plausible enough. But we can hardly fail to notice that it
carries with it the implication that the proposition that copyright is
about promoting creativity is, at least in one of its determinations,
what we might call, for lack of a better phrase, an autonomously normative proposition. It is a proposition about what copyright ought to
be rather than about what copyright is. Thus, whether that proposition is correct or not is not a question that can be answered empirically. The basic thrust of the proposition is to insist that, regardless of
the empirical reality of copyright expansion, copyright ought to be
different. From this point of view, to seek to evaluate or validate the
proposition empirically is to have misunderstood its very nature.
There is nothing surprising about that. The critical bent that the minimalist stance adopts is but an admission that, if it were determinative,
the empirical evidence would disprove the proposition that copyright
is about promoting creativity. The minimalist point is actually that
copyright has failed to become what it truly is.
The obvious advantage of the distinction between empirical and
normative from the standpoint of the minimalist stance is that the
stance need not be abandoned in the wake of copyright expansion.
The expansion of copyright protection as an empirical matter of fact
need not invalidate the normative claim that copyright is about promoting creativity. On the contrary, the divergence between fact and
norm, between history and juridical order, has the ironic yet welcome
effect of strengthening the stance, casting it not as a merely descriptive account, but rather as a critical theory seeking to push the actual
beyond its limits.
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At the same time, however, the distinction between empirical and
normative also entails that if by some magic we were to find ourselves
in an alternate universe in which copyright protection would have
contracted and, correlatively, the public domain would have
expanded, this contraction and this expansion would still not validate
the normative claim that copyright is about promoting creativity.
That is, we could not in such a universe happily say to ourselves: "Oh,
well, isn't that wonderful! Copyright truly is about promoting creativity." The reason we could not do that is straighforward: just as the
divergence between copyright theory and copyright practice cannot
normatively disprove the theory, so the convergence of theory and
practice cannot prove the theory. The minimalist stance cannot very
well refuse to find itself invalidated by the empirical expansion of copyright, yet seek to see itself validated in an empirical contraction of
copyright. It cannot just pick whatever facts it wants in order to feel
self-satisfied. All that could be said in an alternate universe where
copyright protection has contracted is that the minimalist stance has
moved from being descriptively inaccurate to being descriptively accurate. But its normative validation would still remain an open question.
Just as the actual success of the maximalist expansionist project is no
reason to accept it, so would the implementation of the minimalist
project not amount to proof of the normative validity of the minimalist theory. In short, the very structure of the minimalist stance as a
stance critical of existing reality entails that it cannot seek to find its
normative aspirations empirically validated.
Of course, especially in the United States, the proposition that
copyright is about promoting creativity is, quite obviously, a constitutional imperative about the "progress of the Arts," not some sort of
empirical hypothesis to be validated in practice. But that is precisely
the point. If that observation were taken seriously, one would expect
that the copyright wars would look less like a largely empirical debate
about the requirements of progress, and more like a deeply juridical
debate about, inter alia, the meaning of authorship, the meaning of
progress, the nature of their interrelationship, and the sense in which
legal protection of authorship can be meaningfully understood as a
mere means to progress. Questions about the nature of authorship
are plainly prior to questions about how to promote it. One would
need to know what progress is in order to provide incentives for its
production.
These observations are simple. Yet they are worth making
explicit because they reveal that, to the extent that the copyright wars
are largely empirical debates about how to provide incentives for
authorship, the copyright wars either (a) treat the constitutional
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imperative as a "mere" empirical hypothesis to be validated in practice, or (b) assume that the meaning of authorship in particular or of
the constitutional imperative in general is so plain and self-evident
that it does not require elaborate discussion. In neither case does the
bare invocation of the constitutional imperative as such resolve the
predicament in which the minimalist stance must find itself for so
long as it persists on framing the problem of copyright as a merely or
largely empirical matter. The problem is not so much that we do not
have enough social science evidence to assess the effects of copyright
protection. Nor is it that social science evidence about such effects is
hard to collect. That may well be true. But the problem is deeper. It
is that copyright justification, precisely as such, is not an empirical
matter to be resolved through social science evidence collection.
More to the point, to the extent that justificatory problems are
drowned in oceans of social science evidence, it becomes more and
more difficult to raise the question whether instrumentalism itself,
rather than its specifically maximalist construal, directs the relentless
march of copyright expansion. It is as if, by virtue of some kind of
ironic reversal, minimalism would become a participant in the very
expansion it seeks to counter.
IV. A STRIKING

REVERSAL

Matters are not helped by the persistent prejudice, widespread in
North America, that non-instrumentalist accounts of copyright law are
irremediably unfriendly to the public domain. Indeed, it is by no
mean difficult to detect the presence of that view as early as the foundational "literary property debate,"1 1 the great "battle between booksellers,"'12 that took place in eighteenth century England in the wake
of the enactment of the Statute of Anne. 13 This is not the place to
rehearse a more or less well known story. Suffice it to recall that the
great battle of the booksellers opposed statutory copyright to common
law copyright, giving rise thereby to the still prevailing sense that
whereas instrumentalist accounts construe copyright as a statutory
scheme designed to provide incentives for innovation in the name of
the public interest, rights-based accounts of copyright protection
favour authorial interest at the expense of the public interest.
11

BRAD SHERMAN

&

LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROP-

ERTY LAW 40 (1999).

12
13

MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 4-6 (1993).
See Ronan DEAZLEV, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO Copy

44-46 (2004);

see

also Simon Stern, From Author's Right to Property Right, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcom-

ing 2012).
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Mark Rose frames his classic account of the period as a chronicle
15
of the overturning of Millarv. Taylor1 4 in Donaldson v. Beckett. If Millaraffirmed copyright in published works as a perpetual common law
right I6 Donaldson held, to the contrary, that the Statute of Anne occupied the field of published works, such that copyright duration was to
be limited as provided by the Statute.1 7 This is, of course, a familiar
story. The London booksellers (who had argued for perpetual copyright) lost the great literary property debate. The Statute of Anne, a
statute ostensibly premised on the public interest in the "encouragement of learning,"1 8 prevailed victorious over their common law
claims to perpetual copyright.
Less familiar but equally true is that the story Mark Rose tells us is
actually less about the victory of Donaldson over Millarthan it is about
the very opposite-about the victory of Millar over Donaldson. The
story of the literary property debate is not the story of the triumph of
statutory copyright over common law copyright. In Rose's hands, it is
rather the story of the emergence of the author as "proprietor," of the
work subject to copyright as an instance of commodified value, and of
copyright law itself as a mechanism designed to distribute or to balance the products of authorial labour between authors and users, cre20
ators and public.1 9 "Let us note a striking reversal," Rose writes.
"Donaldson v. Becket is conventionally regarded as having established
the statutory basis of copyright, and of course it did. But given the way
Donaldson came to be understood, perhaps it should be simultaneously regarded as confirming the notion of the author's common-law
right put forward by Mansfield and Blackstone." 21 While the London
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

(1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.).
(1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.); see ROSE, supra note 12, at 4-5, 67-69.
See Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 225-90.
See Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. at 843-47.
1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
See RoSE, supra note 12, at 78-112.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 13, 111-12. Elsewhere, Rose writes:
The London booksellers failed to secure perpetual copyright, but their
arguments did develop the representation of the author as a proprietor, and
this representation was very widely disseminated. Moreover, the Lords' decisions did not touch the basic contention that the author had a property in

the product of his labor. Neither the representation of the author as a proprietor nor the representation of the literary work as an object of property
was discredited. Nor, I suspect, could these contentions have been discredited at this point in history: too many and too powerful economic and social

and ideological forces were at work. So long as society was and is organized
around the principles of possessive individualism, the notion that the author
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booksellers failed to secure perpetual copyright, their representations
of the author as a proprietor and of the literary work as an object of
property were widely and successfully disseminated. These representations are, of course, still with us today in one form or another. They
continue to provide rhetorical and juridical tools that enable and
facilitate the propertization of the "learning" that the Stature of Anne
was ostensibly intended to encourage. The manifest story about the
triumph of public interest concerns turns out to be a latent story about
the commodification of knowledge.
The structure of this "striking reversal" is by no means some
merely historical curiosity. One example will suffice. Consider the
more or less recent transition in North American copyright law from a
"sweat of the brow" standard of originality to a "creativity" 22 or-as we
now put it in Canada-a "skill and judgment" standard of originality. 23 There is here once again a manifest story and a latent story.
Manifestly, the move away from the sweat of the brow standard
appears as a heightening of the copyright threshold and therefore as a
victory of the public domain. The classic case of Feist PublicationsInc.
v. Rural Telephone Service Co.24 puts this eloquently. The Court notes
that the move toward a creativity standard entails that "much of the
fruit of the compiler's labor may be used by others without compensation."25 But "It]his result," the Court adds, "is neither unfair nor
unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress
of science and art." 26 The Canadian version of the public's victory
27
over the sweat of the author's brow is similar.
The latent story of this movement from sweat of the brow to creativity is of course far less cheerful. Permit me to put it as follows. We
are accustomed to thinking of the sweat of the brow standard as a
standard providing that an author is entitled to the products of her
labour-to the value she originates through her labour. Under sweat
of the brow jurisprudence, curing misappropriations of that value is
has the same kind of property right in his work as any other laborer must
and will recur.
Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern
Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 69-70 (1988) (emphasis in original).

22 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 352-63 (1991).
23 See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can., 2004 SCC 13, para. 25,
[2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.).
24 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
25 Id. at 349.
26 Id. at 350.
27 See CCH Canadian Ltd., 2004 SCC 13, paras. 22-24.
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perhaps the very purpose of copyright law. 28 But the sweat of the

brow standard is in fact composed of two related, yet separable
aspects. One is that the author is entitled-or at least primafacie entitled-to the value she originates. The other, implicit in the first, is
that the author is an originator of value. Now the shift from the sweat
of the brow standard to the creativity standard dislodges the first
aspect (that the author is entitled to the value she originates) but
retains the second (that the author is an originator of value). Thus,
while the victory of the creativity standard affirms and sets the stage
for what we might call a redistribution of value from author to public,
it falls short of presenting a challenge to the very concept of the
author as value-originator. The image of the author as an originator
of commodified value emerges triumphant, even as the distribution of
29
that value is no longer prima facie weighted in her favour.
I would not be one to scoff at this redistribution. But nor do I
wish to take it at face value. Celebrating it uncritically is as misguided
as taking for granted the so-called victory of Donaldson over Millar.
The difficulty is that the distributive image of copyright law, the image
of copyright law as a balance, carries with it an understanding of the
work as an instance of commodified value, and, no less importantly, of
the expansion of the public domain as a decrease in the price that the
public must pay for the production of works of authorship. Even
when deployed in support of a vigorous public domain, that is, the
image of copyright law as a balance cannot help but generate an
impoverished vision of the public domain as nothing other than a
30
lower or lowered price.
Unsurprisingly, it is at best difficult to insist upon the stakes of
the public domain in a language that reduces those stakes to some
sort of entitlement to values for which payment is minimized. The
juridical significance of publicity is very hard to establish in a discursive context that would construe publicity as bargain prices for otherwise valuable commodities.3 1 The public domain as "freebie"
28

Walter v. Lane, [1900] A.C. 539 (H.L.) 545 ("I should very much regret it if I

were compelled to come to the conclusion that the state of the law permitted one
man to make profit and to appropriate to himself the labour, skill, and capital of
another .... In the view I take of this case I think the law is strong enough to restrain
what to my mind would be a grievous injustice. The law which I think restrains it is to
be found in the Copyright Act. .. ").
29 For an analysis of this dynamic cast as a comment on CCH v. Law Society of
Upper Canada, see Abraham Drassinower, Canadian Originality: Remarks on a Judgment
in Search of an Author, in AN EMERGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PARADIGM 139 (Ysolde
Gendreau ed., 2008).
30 See Drassinower, From Distribution to Dialogue, supra note 6, at 1001.

31

On commodification, see MARGARETJ.

RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES

(1996).
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obtained at the author's expense is far from providing an image capable of anchoring a critical theory of existing copyright. The upshot is
that the public domain contracts through the operation of the very
framework that was ostensibly designed to further it. Thus, for example, the claim to perpetual copyright that Donaldson did indeed
debunk is no longer as implausible today as it appeared to be then,
unless of course one cares to distinguish ever so subtly between life
plus seventy, on the one hand, and perpetuity, on the other.32 Similarly, the author's prima facie entitlement to the full value of her
labour, as provided in sweat of the brow jurisprudence, is not all that
distant from current and ongoing, pervasive and successful, claims
that technological protection measures can and should lock up that
value to make sure it is not unfairly misappropriated.
In both instances, albeit in different senses, the failure to develop
the integral role of the public domain is inseparable from a failure to
formulate radically non-proprietary conceptions of the author-work
relation. Even efforts to formulate the fundamentals of copyright law
as a distributive balance are in the end insufficient. They share and
perhaps are part and parcel of the same problem. So long as copyright balancing is conceived as a balancing or distribution of commodified values, even if these values are regarded as so-called
temporary monopolies rather than as objects of property, chances are
that we will encounter ever-recurrent repetitions of the striking reversal whereby Millar asserts its claims not against but precisely through
Donaldson. Copyright expansion has in large part taken place and
continues to take place under the dominance of the vision of copyright law as a statutory instrument of learning or progress.
V.

THE INHERENT DIGNITY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

The problem is that instrumentalism can offer no concept of the
necessary role of the public domain in copyright law. To understand
this, it suffices to note that instrumentalism posits not only the

author's right but also the public domain as an instrument of the public interest in the production and dissemination of works of authorship. The entirety of copyright law, and thus the public domain as an
aspect of copyright law, is conceived instrumentally. Thus, for example, both originality and fair use are doctrinal means whereby the
public interest is served. Precisely as an instrument of the public
interest, the public domain has a role in copyright law only to the
32 In the United States the duration of copyright protection is life plus seventy
years, see 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2010). The Statute of Anne, by contrast, allowed for a
maximum term of 28 years.
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extent that it is deemed necessary to the implementation of the public
interest. The public domain's role in the structure of copyright law is
contingent upon the performance of a function. Where this function
can be more efficiently performed by other means, the public domain
can and ought to be minimized or eliminated in the name of the public interest. The point to grasp is that the instrumentalist commitment to the public interest is not a commitment to the public domain.
Consider, for example, the view that a public domain is necessary
to the extent that transaction costs involved in licensing the use of
works of authorship would operate contrary to the public interest in
the efficient use of those works. By eliminating the need for a licence,
the public domain inserts itself, as it were, where the market fails to
produce the efficient outcome. The role of the public domain is thus
contingent on more or less empirically driven assessments of the
degree to which certain transactions would or would not take place in
the absence of the free availability of the works in question. Once the
public domain is instrumentalized in this way, as a kind of safety net
designed to protect us from market failure, then its role in copyright
law is negotiable, derivative of more or less empirical assessments of
the likelihood or lack thereof of particular behavioural patterns.
Thus, where technological developments make it possible to overcome transaction costs in the way of licensing, it becomes more and
more difficult to postulate the need for a public domain. One-click
licensing can liberate us from the public domain. If fair use is market
failure, 33 the degree to which technology can help the market cure
itself, so to speak, is the degree to which the public domain is but the
obsolete manifestation of a now-overcome failure. Once we have
agreed that the public domain is what it is too expensive to charge
for,34 we can just get rid of the public domain as soon as we come up
with more and more frictionless ways of charging for it.
The basic problem is that instrumentalist theory is not a theory of
the necessary role of the public domain in copyright law. It is a theory
of the public interest in the production and dissemination of information commodities known as works of authorship. Thus, within instru33 The phrase is Wendy Gordon's. See WendyJ. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982). For a deployment of the concept of fair use as market
failure in the direction of a minimization of the public domain, see Tom W. Bell, Fair
Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's FairUse Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557 (1998). For Gordon's own rejection of that view, see Wendy
J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public's Right to Fair Use: Amending Section 107 to Avoid
the 'Fared Use' Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 619.
34 With thanks to Arthur Ripstein for this way of phrasing it.
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mentalist discourse, the question of the public domain, like that of the
author's right, is a question about the requirements of the public
interest. To be sure, nothing about the concept of the public interest
requires a constricted public domain. But nor does anything in that
concept necessitate a vigorous public domain. The important point is
that, even under the rubric of minimalist aspirations, the dominance
of instrumentalist discourse means that it is the public interest, and
not the public domain, that is of primary and fundamental
importance.
Of course, minimalism does and will insist that the public interest
requires a vigorous rather than a constricted public domain. To the
extent that it takes shape in instrumentalist terms, however, this very
insistence arises from and responds to a context in which the contingency, and hence negotiability, of the role of the public domain in
copyright law is both presupposed and unchallenged. The recurrent
upshot is that the role of the public domain is not nearly as secure as
that of the author, whose role as producer of the very subject matter
to be disseminated is more difficult to question from the standpoint of
the instrumentalist paradigm. Minimalist aspirations would be well
served by a theory of the public domain as irreducible rather than as
contingent upon something other than itself and of which it is a mere
instrument-a theory of the public domain as constitutive rather than
derivative.
One of the largely unexplored possibilities that a rights-based
account of copyright law can provide is precisely that of a formulation
of the public domain constitutively. This possibility-which I want to
sketch ever so briefly by way of conclusion-requires a twofold move.
The first is to define the work of authorship as an act of communication. The second is to formulate the limits of authorial entitlement to
the work along two related axes, one having to do with the scope of
the entitlement, and the other with the subject matter of the entitlement-i.e. with the definition of the work as an act of
communication.
The definition of the work as a communicative act can be formulated in several ways, but one fairly direct way is to be found in the
classic account of the distinction between copyright subject matter
and patent subject matter in Baker v. Selden.35 In Baker, the Court
dealt with the copyrightability of accounting forms included in a book
explaining the operation of an accounting system.3 6 The peculiarity
of the forms from a copyright perspective was that they performed a
35
36

101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879).
See id. at 101.

2011]

INCENTIVES,

RIGHTS,

AND

THE PUBLIC

DOMAIN

1883

twofold function. 3 7 As part of the plaintiff's book, they were part of
the explanation of how the accounting system operates. That is, the
forms were part of the plaintiff's communication, as an author, of the
38
substance of his contribution to the art and science of accounting.
But in addition to being an aspect of the plaintiff's explanation of the
accounting system, they were also integral to the very operation of
that system itself. 39 The forms were thus part and parcel of both book
40
and system, of both communication and substance communicated.
Juridically, the twofold significance of the forms amounted to the
finding that the forms were copyrightable as aspects of the book but
not as aspects of the system. 4 1 The defendant in Baker was free from
liability because the use of which the plaintiff complained was a use of
the accounting system, to which copyright law could not grant exclusivity.4 2 Yet the Court pointed out that the communicative uses of the
forms (i.e. uses of the forms to explain rather than operate the
accounting system) would nonetheless give rise to liability. 43 In short,
while the defendant could operate the plaintiffs system free from liability, he could not have reproduced the forms in another book
explaining the plaintiffs system. 44
At the level of subject matter, then, the construal of the work as a
communicative act would liberate any noncommunicative uses of a
work from liability. Recent case law dealing with copyright law and
digital technology, for example, finds that unauthorized reproductive
uses of copyright subject matter in non-communicative ways fails to
45
give rise to liability.
37

See id. at 104.

38

See id.

39

See id.

40

See id.

41

See id. at 104-05.

42

See id. at 107.

See id. at 104.
44 See id. ("[T]he teachings of science and the rules and methods of useful art
have their final end in application and use; and this application and use are what the
public derive from the publication of a book which teaches them. But as embodied
and taught in a literary composition or book, their essence consists only in their statement. This alone is what is secured by the copyright. The use by another of the same
methods of statement, whether in words or illustrations,in a book publishedfor teaching the art,
would undoubtedly be an infringement of the copyright." (emphasis added)).
43

45 See, e.g., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir.
2009); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003); Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass'n. of Internet Providers, 2004

SCC 45, para. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (Can.).
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At the level of scope, what we generally call "transformative" uses,
or rather uses of an author's work in the work of another, would be
legitimate to the extent that such uses are reasonably necessary for the
second author's work. On this view, fair use or fair dealing for the
purpose of criticism is fair because the defendant is responding to the
plaintiffs work in her own work. She is not merely repeating the work
parasitically. To the extent that she is herself an author, the plaintiff
cannot consistently deny the legitimacy of the use because his own
claim is, after all, an authorship claim. The defense makes the plaintiffs work freely available to the defendant, yet only where such use is
reasonably necessary for the defendant's own authorship. It affirms
the defendant's user right while sustaining the plaintiff's authorial
right. The defense thus operates as a bilateral recognition of the parties' equal claims as authors. It affirms and sustains a principle of
authorship to which both parties appeal and to which both must be
subject. Not market failure, but the equality as authors of the parties
to a copyright action grounds the legitimacy of fair use or fair dealing
46
for the purpose of criticism.

While other deployments of both subject matter and scope limitations conceived from the standpoint of the work as a communicative
act are certainly possible, the crucial point to note here is that neither
kind of limitation is imposed on the author, as it were externally, but
rather each and both flow from the very nature of copyright subject
matter as communicative. Because they do, the limitations involved
are not negotiable pieces of the instruments required to achieve some
would-be public interest. They are necessary, constitutive and irreducible dimensions of a copyright law conceived as a juridical recognition
of the dignity of authorship.
Minimalism would be well advised to heed the observation that
the market failure theory of the author's right carries in its wake a
market failure theory of the public domain. The rights-based
account, by contrast, is not merely an account of the author but also
of the public domain as a matter of inherent dignity. It is an account
of the radical non-negotiability of the constitutive role of the public
domain in copyright law. I think that it is as such worthy of far more
attention than we have managed to give it.

46 On equality and copyright, see Drassinower, supra note 3, at 211-14, Drassinower, A Rights-Based View, supra note 6, at 9, and Gordon, supra note 3, at 1540-81.

